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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

*

Appellee,
vs.

*
*

ELMER R. MONDRAGON, Jr.,
RONNIE J. MANZANARES, and
CASEY J. CUTLER,
Defendants and
Appellants.

Case No.

*

960757-CA
960777-CA
960778-CA

Priority 10
*
*

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order from the First District Court, Judge Ben H.
Hadfield, denying the Defendants' Motion to Suppress. The Defendants face two counts of
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8
(1953 as amended) and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A
Misdemeanor, in violation of § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended). The District Court Judge found that
there was no reason to suppress the evidence from the search. The Defendants cases were stayed
pending the result of this appeal.
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal was conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A § 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
Are the trial court'sfindingsof fact, that underlie the memorandum decision on the
Suppression hearing, clearly erroneous and thus reversible error?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the trial court'sfindingsof fact, clear error will be found only when the trial
court's factualfindingsrun against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d
655, 657 (Utah App. 1996). The trial court'sfindingsof fact will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous. State v. Thurman. 846P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993).
POINT n
Were the trial court's conclusions that the Defendant gave voluntary consent to search the
vehicle and that the officer had reasonable suspicion correct?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on the facts for
correctness according no deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d
655, 657 (Utah App. 1996), State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996). Further,
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. State v. Bello. 871 P.2d
584, 586 (Utah App. 1994).
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POINT m
Was the interrogation of Cutler and Manzanares intrusive, beyond the scope of the stop,
without probable cause and a violation of their constitutional rights against search and seizure?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on the facts for
correctness according no deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d
655, 657 (Utah App. 1996), State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996). Further,
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. State v. Bello. 871 P.2d
584, 586 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE
United States Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
See addendum B.
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14
See addendum B.
U.C.A. § 58-37-8
See addendum B.
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 (2)
See addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Elmer Mondragon ("Mondragon") was pulled over by a Utah Highway
Patrol Trooper, for speeding and failure to signal. Incident to the stop, the Trooper searched the
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car, the trunk and the passengers without voluntary consent. The Defendants filed Motions to
Suppress, a hearing was held on the Suppression Motions at the First District Court of Box Elder
County, before Judge Ben H. Hadfield. The Suppression Motions were denied and the
Defendants appeal the Memorandum Decision and Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE RECORD
On September 22, 1995, at approximately 1:35 p.m., Trooper Singleton ("Trooper") was
traveling on southbound 1-15 when he paced a Monte Carlo traveling seven miles-per-hour over
the speed limit. (R. 4-6). The Trooper stopped the vehicle and obtained the valid drivers license
and registration from the driver, the Defendant Mr. Mondragon ("Mondragon"). The Trooper
placed Mondragon's drivers license and registration in the pocket of his uniform. The Trooper did
not proceed to run an NCIC check on the driver or the vehicle, nor did the Trooper proceed to
complete a citation for speeding and failure to signal. (R. 23). Instead, the Trooper initiated
questioning of the driver in regard to an alleged odor of burnt tobacco. (R. 7).
The Trooper asked if anyone in the car was nineteen (19) years old. One passenger, the
Defendant Casey J. Cutler ("Cutler"), indicated that he was, but he did not provide identification
to prove it. (R. 7,18,22).
With Mondragon's drivers license and registration retained in the Trooper's uniform
pocket, the Trooper requested to search the passenger compartment of the car for tobacco.
Mondragon allegedly consented to the search. (R. 8).
The Trooper requested that Mondragon get out of the car, the Trooper did a pat down
frisk on Mondragon and ordered that Mondragon stand in front of the vehicle. (R. 8). The
Trooper requested the passenger in the front seat, Defendant Ronnie J. Manzanares
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("Manzaneres") to exit the vehicle. The Trooper performed a pat down search on Manzanares,
requested his name, identification and the Trooper ordered Manzanares to stand in front of the
vehicle. (R. 8). The Trooper requested the back seat passenger, Defendant Casey Cutler, to exit
the vehicle and performed the same routine on Cutler. (R. 8).
The Trooper did a pat down frisk on Cutler and believed he felt a wallet. The Trooper
requested Cutler to remove his wallet and the Trooper proceeded to open Cutler's wallet. The
Trooper located Cutler's drivers license in the wallet. The license revealed Cutler's birth date of
June 06, 1972. However, the Trooper testified his math skills were not good and that it would
take him "quite a while" to figure out Cutler's age. (R. 16). After, obtaining Cutler's
identification, the Trooper asked if Cutler had any outstanding warrants. Cutler stated he had a
warrant outstanding in Salt Lake County. After, obtaining this information, the Trooper pocketed
the identification, ordered Cutler to stand at the front of the vehicle with the other two
Defendants, and the Trooper continued on with the search of the vehicle. (R. 18, 23, 28).
The Trooper found no contraband in the car. After the search, the Trooper ordered the
Defendants to return to the vehicle. (R. 32). At the time the Defendants were requested to return
to the vehicle, the Trooper still had possession of the Defendants' identification. (R. 32). The
Trooper testified that at no time did he have an articulable suspicion of the Defendants
committing any criminal activity. (R. 32-33).
The Trooper turned to go back to his patrol car, paused, and then returned again to
Mondragon and ordered Mondragon to "pop" the trunk to allow the Trooper to look at the
alleged defective taillight. (R. 20, Video). Mondragon hesitated and stated that he would get the
taillight checked out in Salt Lake City. (R. 19). The Trooper disregarded Mondragon's request
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and again ordered Mondragon to open the trunk. When the trunk was opened the Trooper and
Mondragon looked at the taillight box and determined that access was too difficult without the
proper tools. (R. 20).
The Trooper then moved to the left of Mondragon and made inquires in regard to the a
duffel bag contained in the trunk. (R. 21-22). The Trooper asked to whom the duffel bag
belonged. Mondragon stated that it belonged to everyone. (R. 13). The Trooper proceeded to
question Mondragon regarding the contents of the duffel bag. The Trooper was concerned that
there was tobacco in the bag because of the Trooper's observation of a strong smell of fresh burnt
tobacco at the inception of the stop and because of the "absolute absence of any smoking material
in the driver's compartment. (R. 13-14, 22). The Trooper stated it made sense the tobacco could
be in the trunk. Therefore, the Trooper asked Mondragon if he could look inside the duffel bag.
Mondragon allegedly stated yes. This consent was after the Trooper had taken the three
occupants out of the car, searched each one with a pat down frisk, completed a search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, and was without having written a citation or returning the
Defendants'identification. (R. 13-14,22-24)
Upon search of the duffel bag the Trooper found controlled substances and placed the
three Defendants under arrest.
The Defendants requested a Suppression Hearing and the State provided evidence and
testimony of the Trooper. The Defendants' provided a copy of the video made by the Trooper's
patrol car video equipment. (R. 15, 33). The trial court took the evidence and argument under
advisement and issued a memorandum decision denying the motion to suppress. The Defendants'
appeal the memorandum decision.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Trooper's misconduct expanded the scope of the detention beyond the purpose which
justified the detention. Such intrusion violated the Appellants' constitutional rights to be free from
unwarranted search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment of U.S.
Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IN THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD
BE REVERSED
The trial court's findings in the Memorandum Decision and Order, from the Suppression
Hearing, are in error and do not accurately reflect the facts surrounding the incidents leading to
the search and arrests.
Utah case law establishes that the trial court's findings of fact that underlie its
determination will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883,
885 (Utah App. 1995). This Court found that clear error will be "found only when the trial
court's factual findings run against the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d
655,657 (Utah App. 1996).
In the present case the trial court found that:
Trooper Singleton then pulled the vehicle over. During the
discussion which followed, it was determined Elmer Mondragon
was the owner/driver of the vehicle and that he had a valid
driver's license. Additionally, it was determined that Casey
J. Cutler was one of the passengers and there was an outstanding
warrant for his arrest. The officer had the defendants
assist him in testing the turn signals and brake lights and
determined that neither the turn signals nor the brake lights
7

were working on the rear of the vehicle, although
apparently the turn signals did work on the front of the vehicle.
Because the front lights worked, the officer theorized that
a fuse was not out but that perhaps there was a problem with
wiring or a light bulb. The defendant opened the trunk of
the vehicle and it was determined that the taillights were enclosed
in such a way that tools would be required in order to gain
access to the bulbs. At that time, a single duffel bag was
observed in the trunk of the car and the officer asked
Mondragon if he could look in the duffel bag. Mondragon
said he could.
(See addendum C). The trial court in the above findings completely omitted the officer's
actions in obtaining Mondragon's consent to the search and in maintaining possession of Cutler's
identification. The trial court failed to discuss and recite the relevant facts leading up to the
officer's testing of the turn signals and the officer's illegal entry into the trunk.
The trial court focused only upon the facts surrounding the alleged consent and search of
the duffel bag without a proper analysis of the total circumstances. The trial court failed to
analyze the following:
a) the initial stop when the Trooper expanded the scope of the stop to inquire if the
Appellants were of legal age to possess tobacco (R. 7,8);
b) the Trooper's misconduct in continuing the search of the car once the Trooper
discovered that there was an individual old enough to possess tobacco (R. 18,23,28);
c) how the Trooper obtained entrance into the trunk. The trial court determined that the
Appellant opened the trunk of the vehicle, nothing more (R. 19,20);
d) finally, the trial court did not support its conclusion of how or why the court found the
Appellant's action of opening the trunk was voluntary.
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Upon review of the facts, the Appellants assert the Court will find clear error in the
correctness of the facts. As such, the Appellants request that the Court find that the trial court's
factual findings run against the weight of the evidence and reverse the trial court's findings of fact.
State v. Ziegleman. 905 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah App. 1995).

POINT II
TROOPER SINGLETON UNLAWFULLY EXTENDED MR.
MONDRAGON'S DETENTION BEYOND THE PURPOSE
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE DETENTION.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15 specifically delineates a peace officer's authority to detain
suspects. That section provides,
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of evidence or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation
of his actions.
Thus, by statute, an officer's authority at a traffic stop is limited to obtaining the suspects name,
address, and an explanation of his actions relating to the stop. The statute does not explicitly limit
an officer to demanding only those "explanations" that relate to the purpose of the stop.
However, extensive case law makes very clear the point that an officer is limited to investigating,
or seeking "explanations," that relate to the purpose of the stop. An officer, for example, who has
stopped a suspect for speeding is not authorized to demand information concerning matters
unrelated to the speeding offense. This is exactly what occurred in the present case, and this point
is addressed more fully below.
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The Tenth Circuit has held that "[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request
a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation." United
States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812,
815 (10th Cir. 1991). "When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled
to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further
delay by police for additional questioning." Id

"[Fjurther questioning and the concomitant

detention of a driver are permissible in either of two circumstances: (1) during the course of the
traffic stop the officer acquires an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver
is engaged in illegal activity, or (2) the driver voluntarily consents to the officer's additional
questioning." United States v. Sandoval 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994).
The Utah Supreme Court has held, in State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), that
an officer's traffic stop must retain a "reasonable scope," "last[ing] no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id, at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983)). The court further stated,
The purpose of the stop is to request a driver's license and a valid registration, run a
computer check on the car and/or the driver, and issue a citation. Unsupported by further
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions
unrelated to the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope of
the circumstances that rendered it permissible. Thus, existing Fourth Amendment law
precludes an officer from extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to investigate a
suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion.
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals "has recognized that '[a]n officer
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a
computer check, and issue a citation1. . . Moreover, '[t]he officer may also check for outstanding
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warrants 'so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention. . . 'Any further
temporary detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial
traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable
suspicion of serious criminal activity.'" State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 658-9 (Utah App. 1996).
If an officer violates this constitutional rule, and extends the length or scope of a stop
beyond the lawful purposes of the stop, then the detention becomes illegal, Terry v. Ohio. 392
U.S. 1 (1968), and the evidence obtained as a result of that illegality becomes suppressible under
Wong Sun. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
To demonstrate the importance of this rule, and the severity of the consequences of
breaking it, it is helpful to refer to two cases that have come out of the Tenth Circuit. First, in
United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th. Cir. 1988), the court noted that even an
unlawful detention of a relatively short duration is unconstitutional because "it nevertheless
unreasonably extend[s] beyond the length necessary for its only legitimate purpose~the issuance
of a citation

" Id at 1519 n. 8. Second, in United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir.

1991), the court upheld a lower court's finding of a constitutional violation based upon an officer's
extending the detention only a few seconds in order to ask the driver of the vehicle "if there were
any weapons in the vehicle, if there were any open containers of alcohol in the vehicle, and if there
was any controlled substance or paraphernalia of any kind in the vehicle." Id at 814. These
questions, the court reasoned, were unrelated to the speeding offense for which the officer
stopped the vehicle, and, as the officer did not have any reasonable articulable suspicion that the
vehicle contained alcohol, controlled substances, or paraphernalia, he did not have the legal
authority to submit the driver of the vehicle to the extraneous questions. Consequently, even
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though these questions took only a few seconds to ask, the officer had overstepped his
constitutional authority by extending the purpose of the stop to interrogate the driver on unrelated
matters.
In the present case, Trooper Singleton stopped Mr. Mondragon for going seven miles per
hour over the speed limit and for changing lanes without using a turn signal. As a result of his
observation of these alleged infractions, the officer had authority only to "request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation." Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519;
Walker, 933 F.2d at 815. Mr. Mondragon produced his driver's license and registration. (R. 7).
The Trooper then had authority to run a computer check and issue a citation. The record is void
of any evidence that the Trooper ever made a computer check or issued a citation for the offense
which justified the stop. As soon as the Trooper had taken possession of Mr. Mondragon's
driver's license and registration, the Trooper expanded the scope of the stop to investigate "a
burnt smell. . . similar to tobacco." (R. 7). From this point the Trooper never returned to the
purpose of the stop to run a computer check and to issue a citation for speeding and failure to
signal. The Trooper could lawfully deviatefromthis limited scope only if "(1) during the course
of the traffic stop the officer acquire[d] an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
driver [was] engaged in illegal activity, or (2) the driver voluntarily consented] to the officer's
additional questioning." Sandoval 29 F.3d at 540.
A.

TROOPER SINGLETON DID NOT HAVE AN "OBJECTIVELY
REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION" THAT THE
TRUNK OR DUFFEL BAG CONTAINED CONTRABAND.

"Under the fourth amendment, a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when the
officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation, or when the officer has a reasonable
12

articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such as transporting
drugs." State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1997) (Citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1132; State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct.App.1994); and State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879,
882 (Utah Ct.App. 1989.)) Furthermore, reasonable suspicion "is based on objective facts . . .
which are given due weight in light of the reliability of the information . . . and the reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts . . . " State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 141, (Utah App. 1997)
(citing Nguyen, 878 P.2d at 1186; White, 496 U.S. 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416; and State v. Roth,
827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
According to the Trooper's testimony, he allegedly smelled the odor of "fresh" burnt
tobacco as he spoke with the driver of the vehicle, Mr. Mondragon. (R. 22). Mr. Mondragon
disputes that this allegation gave the Trooper an "objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion"
that illegal activity was occurring sufficient to authorize the trooper to deviate from the purposes
of the stop and investigate the presence of tobacco. Nevertheless, even assuming that the
Trooper had authority to perform this unrelated investigation based upon his observation of an
odor of fresh tobacco smoke, this authority would have ended when, as the Trooper testified, he
was told that one of the passengers was nineteen. (R. 7). Moreover, any authority the Trooper
may have had to perform this unrelated investigation would have ended when the Trooper found
and examined the identification card of one of the passengers which showed that the individual
was ofage to possess tobacco. (R. 16). Instead, the Trooper chose to disregard the evidence of
the age of the passenger and searched the passenger compartment for tobacco. The Trooper
failed to uncover any tobacco in the passenger compartment of the car. (R. 22).
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Furthermore, after expanding the scope of the detention to investigate the source of an
odor of tobacco, the Trooper further expanded the scope of the detention and refused to return to
the purpose which justified the stop. During the search of the passenger compartment, the
Trooper noticed spare light bulbs in the glove compartment. The Trooper then ordered Mr.
Mondragon to "pop the trunk," ostensibly, at least, to assist in repairing the taillights with those
bulbs the Trooper had observed. (R. 12). Unquestionably, the Trooper did not have authority to
demand that the trunk be opened in order to inspect the taillights. His authority regarding the
taillight infraction is merely to choose whether to write a ticket or not. Guzman, 864 F.2d at
1519; Walker, 933 F.2d at 815. Whether or not the Trooper could assist in repairing the
taillights had absolutely no bearing on whether or not a signal infraction had occurred, as the
occurrence of an infraction had already been determined when the Trooper allegedly observed the
vehicle change lanes without signaling. Therefore, the Trooper's demand that the trunk be opened
was yet another deviation from the initial scope of the stop. The Trooper's demand that the trunk
be opened was neither based upon any reasonable suspicion nor upon any objective facts that the
trunk contained contraband.
After Mr. Mondragon had complied with the Trooper's demand and had opened the trunk,
the Trooper, yet again, expanded the scope of the stop by turning his attention from inspecting the
taillights to a duffel bag contained in the trunk. (R. 12). And, yet again, the Trooper did not have
authority to investigate the duffel bag. The Trooper had no objectively reasonable and articulable
suspicion sufficient to deviate from the purpose of the stop. The Trooper could not see anything
that would indicate the bag contained contraband; he did not smell anything to indicate that the
bag contained contraband; and he did not discover anything that would indicate the bag contained
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contraband. Therefore, unless Mr. Mondragon had consented to this and the previous extensions
of his detention, the Trooper did not have the legal authority to deviate from the limited purposes
of the traffic stop to extend the detention to question the passengers, search the passengers,
search the passenger compartment, order that the trunk be opened to inspect the lights, inquire
into the ownership of the bag, the contents of the bag, or whether he could search the bag. And,
as will be shown below, consent was neither asked for nor given.

B.

MR. MONDRAGON DID NOT GIVE HIS CONSENT TO THE
EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE AND LENGTH OF THE TRAFFIC
STOP.

As stated previously, the Trooper could lawfully deviatefromthe limited scope of the
traffic stop only if "(1) during the course of the traffic stop the officer acquire[d] an objectively
reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver [was] engaged in illegal activity, or (2) the driver
voluntarily consented] to the officer's additional questioning." Sandoval 29F.3dat540. As
already shown, the Trooper had absolutely no articulable suspicion to justify any action beyond
requesting the license and registration, completing an NCIC. computer check, and issuing a
citation for the observed speeding and signaling offenses. Therefore, unless Mr. Mondragon
voluntarily consented to the Trooper's additional requests, questions, and searches, the evidence
seized as a result of them must be suppressed.
"The government bears the burden on establishing consent, and voluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Mota. 864
F.Supp. 1123 (D. Wyo. 1994) rdting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227-32 (1973)).
The Supreme Court has further stated that "in order to determine whether a particular encounter
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constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to
determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."
Florida v. Bostick. 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (quoted in Sandoval, 29 F.3d at 540).
Under Utah law, even after an illegal search "it is possible to admit the evidence recovered
as a result of the search . . .if both prongs of a two-part test are satisfied: (1) the consent was
voluntarily given, . . . and (2) the consent was not obtained through 'exploitation' of the prior
illegal police conduct." State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Thurman.
846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990)).
First, Mondragon's consent could not have been voluntary. Mondragon could not have
felt free to terminate the encounter with Trooper Singleton under the circumstances confronting
him at the time of the Trooper's initial request to search the passenger compartment. The
Trooper had not even come close tofinishingthe legitimate purposes of the stop. The only action
the Trooper had taken toward completing the purpose of the stop was to take possession of
Mondragon's driver's license and registration. The Trooper had not given Mondragon a citation;
the Trooper had not returned Mondragon's driver's license or registration; and the Trooper had
not told Mondragon that he wasfreeto leave. Furthermore, the Trooper testified that he "asked
Mr. Mondragon to pop the trunk." (R. 12). The Trooper then observed that Mondragon
"hesitated at first, then opened the trunk." (R. 12). Clearly, Trooper Singleton's implication is
that Mr. Mondragon did not want to open the trunk but did anyway to comply with the Trooper's
demand. Thus, the nonconsensual nature of the detention-and all the extensions thereof-cannot
be mistaken as a valid consent.
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Other courts have concluded that officers lacked consent to extend the scope of a traffic
stop on much less evidence than exists in this case. For example, in Sandoval the officer had
placed defendant in his patrol car where he explained the need to obey the speed limit and then
returned the defendant's documents. The defendant then asked the officer, "that's it?"
Whereupon the officer replied, "no, might a minute." 29 F.3rd at 538-39. The court held that,
under these circumstances f,[n]o one . . . can reasonably view himself or herself as free to leave
the patrol car." Id at 542. The court further explained, "at no point did the nature of [the
officer's] inquiries change the climate so that the reasonable listener would view participation in
the exchange as freely terminable by leaving the patrol car." Id
In Mota, the officer returned the defendant's documents before asking them if they had
any drugs, guns, or large amounts of cash in the vehicle. However, the courts found that a
voluntary encounter had still not arisen because "there were simply no words nor gestures of
closure from which a reasonable listener could have determined that the reason for detention was
over and a consensual encounter was beginning." 864 F.Supp. at 1128. "The patrolman did not
pause in the conversation, he did not say anything to indicate his task was finished, and he did not
move his body away from its leaning position on the [car]." Id "Any reasonable listener, in fact
any decent person, would not have felt free to go about his or her business if that meant driving
away and injuring the person leaning up against their car." Id
In the present case, Trooper Singleton had still not completed his duties relating to the
traffic stop. He had not written a ticket; he had maintained possession of Mondragon's
documents; and he had not told them they were free to leave. Thus, the constitutional violation in
this case is much clearer even than those in Sandoval and Mota. In both of those cases, the
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officer had finished writing the ticket and had returned the drivers' documents. Therefore,
Trooper Singleton gave Mondragon absolutely no indications that the encounter had become
consensual, and that Mondragon could leave. Since it is illegal to drive without one's license in
one's possession, no reasonable citizen would consider leaving under the circumstances the
Trooper posed for Mondragon. And, of course, it is beyond dispute that the Trooper did not ask
Mondragon's permission to extend the scope of the stop to investigate the trunk of the car.
Therefore, the Trooper clearly did not obtain Mondragon's consent to the unconstitutional
deviationsfromthe authorized purposes of the stop.
Second, as noted above, the only action the Trooper had taken toward completing the
initial purpose of the stop was to take possession of Mondragon's driver's license and registration.
Even if Mr. Mondragon had given a valid consent to the search, the State must prove that the
consent was not invalidated by the Trooper's misconduct in expanding the scope of the stop. The
State can meet this burden by showing that Mondragon's "consent cannot have been the product
of police exploitation . . . 'or in other words "whether the 'taint' of the Fourth amendment
violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.'" State v. Bello. 871
P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1994). If the search was neither based upon a reasonable articulable
suspicion, nor valid consent, then there are three factors to consider in determining whether the
taint of the Fourth amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the
evidence: "(1) the 'purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,' (2) the 'temporal proximity'
of the illegality and the consent,' and (3) 'the presence of intervening circumstances."' State v.
Zeigleman. 905 P.2d 883, (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 691 n. 4 (citing
Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)).
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In the present case, Trooper Singleton's purpose in stopping Mr. Mondragon was to issue
citations for driving seven miles-per-hour over the speed limit and for failing to signal prior to a
lane change. As to the first attenuation factor, Mondragon contends that the flagrancy of the
Trooper's misconduct is apparent: Under the circumstances which the Trooper searched
Mondragon's car, any citizen whose daily routine may bring him into contact with a tobacco
smoker and whom is in the presence of a minor would be subject to whatever search the Trooper
cared to undertake. Again, cigarette ashes on the floor of a car driven by a grandparent taking his
grandchild to lunch would provide grounds for a search of the entire vehicle and the persons
therein. Such a conclusion shocks the conscience. As to the second attenuation factor, once the
Trooper obtained Mondragon's driver's license and registration, the Trooper undertook his search
for tobacco without undertaking any action toward completing the purpose of the stop. No time
transpired between the Trooper's failure to complete the purpose of the stop and the searches.
When he approached Mondragon and had obtained the license and registration, the Trooper did
not initially ask about the traffic violations but instead chose to search the vehicle for tobacco.
Once the Trooper failed to find tobacco in the passenger compartment, he did not check the
license and registration for validity but chose to continue searching the vehicle without consent by
commanding Mondragon to "pop the trunk." There was only an instant of time between the
illegal expanding of the scope of the stop and Mondragon's alleged consent to search the
passenger compartment. However, there was no consent either requested or obtained to search
the trunk. As to the third attenuation factor, there were no intervening circumstances.
In addition, since the State failed to prove probable cause or exigent circumstances, the
Trooper's violation of Mondragon's article I, section 14, Utah Constitutional rights demands
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"exclusion of illegally obtained evidence [a]s a necessary consequence ..." State v. Larocco. 794
P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 1994).
POINT III
(Appellants Cutler and Manzanares only)
THE INTERROGATION AND SEARCH OF CUTLER AND
MANZANARES WAS INTRUSIVE, BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF THE STOP, WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND A
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
The interrogation and search of Appellants Cutler and Manzanares was intrusive, beyond
the scope of the stop, without probable cause and a violation of their constitutional rights against
unlawful search and seizure.
Utah case law establishes that an officer cannot intrude on a passenger of a vehicle unless
the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Golina-Luna. 826
P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992) (once officer determined passengers of vehicle, pulled over for
possible intoxication, were sober, officer exceeded authority by interrogating defendants without
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity). In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764
(Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court found that a warrants check on a passenger was
unreasonable if the officer had not formed a reasonable articulable suspicion that the passenger
was engaged in any criminal activity.
In the present case, the Trooper believed he smelled the odor offreshburnt tobacco. (R.
22). The Trooper testified that according to Mondragon's identification, Mondragon was not old
enough to possess tobacco. (R. 7). The Trooper inquired if anyone else in the car was old

20

enough to smoke. One of the Appellants stated that Cutler was old enough to possess tobacco.
(R. 7).
The Trooper did not end his inquiry (see Point II), but the Trooper proceeded to search the
vehicle for "contraband." When the Trooper frisked Cutler, he found a wallet and opened it to
reveal a drivers license with a birth date of June, 6, 1972, making Cutler twenty three (23) years
of age. The Trooper testified that he did not know what age Cutler was because the Trooper's
math skills were not very good. (R. 16). The Trooper, while maintaining possession of Cutler's
identification asked Cutler if he had any warrants. Cutler replied that he though he had one out of
Salt Lake County. (R. 30). After Cutler was frisked, Cutler was ordered to the front of the
vehicle and was not free to leave. (R. 33).
The Trooper inquired about Manzanares' identification. Manzanares did not have
identification on him. However, the Trooper asked Manzanares if he had any warrants
outstanding. Once Manzanares was frisked he was ordered to the front of the vehicle and was not
free to leave. (R. 33)
In the above incidents the Trooper violated established Utah case law that prohibits an
officer from intruding on passengers without reasonable articulable suspicion. In Johnson the
Supreme Court stated "the leap from asking for the passengers name and date of birth to running
a warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific and articulable facts
and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch." State v.Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, (Utah 1991), Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
The Appellants were passengers in a car driven by Appellant Mondragon. The Trooper
pulled the car over for speeding and failure to signal, both valid traffic violations. However, the
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Trooper expanded the scope of the stop immediately, see Point II. The Trooper did not have an
articulable suspicion of serious criminal activity. What the Trooper had was a suspicion or hunch.
The Trooper ignored the case law that governs traffic stops, for his suspicion or hunch. A
practice that is in direct opposition to the case law established by the Utah Supreme Court.
Johnson.
Under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Appellants' protection against
warrantless searches were violated. The Utah Supreme Court established that a passenger has a
right from warrantless searches and seizures. Johnson. In this case the Trooper violated the
Appellants' rights. The Trooper had no articulable suspicion of a criminal activity, when he
discovered Appellant Cutler was of age to possess tobacco. Further, the contraband of tobacco
that the Trooper was searching for no longer existed since Appellant Cutler was of age to possess
tobacco. Therefore, under Larocco the Trooper could not proceed against the Appellants, there
was neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances, both being necessary for a warrantless
search. The Trooper's intrusive actions violated the Appellants' rights under Article I Section 14
of the Utah Constitution, all evidence from the search, arrest and interrogations should be
excluded. State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990) (Plurality opinion).
The Trooper's detention of the Appellants beyond what was reasonably related in scope to
the traffic stop was not justified by an articulable suspicion that the Appellants had committed a
crime or were engaged in any criminal activity. Both the Appellants' Fourth amendment rights
were violated, and the evidence obtained pursuant to the arrest should be suppressed.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of fact from the trial court could not be supported by the weight of evidence
that was presented. The findings of fact should be found erroneous and reversed.
Trooper Singleton only had authority to obtain identification, run a computer check, and
write a traffic citation. The Trooper unconstitutionally deviated from this authorized scope when
he demanded that Mr. Mondragon open the trunk and, more especially, when he interrogated Mr.
Mondragon regarding the ownership of the bag, its contents, and whether he would let the
Trooper search it. As the Trooper did not have an objectively reasonable and articulable
suspicion to support this additional intrusion and detention, and as the Trooper did not obtain Mr
Mondragon's valid consent, the fruits of the illegal intrusion and detention must now be
suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree, Wong Sun. 371 U.S. 471 (1963), "without sufficient
attenuation" to allow admission of the evidence, State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App.
1994)

and as "a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14" of the Utah

Constitution. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990).
Further, the Trooper immediately focused his attention on the passengers Cutler and
Manzanares. The Trooper's intrusive questioning and searches violated the passengers rights
against warrantless search and seizure. State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). As such any
and all evidence from such intrusion and detention must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous
tree. Wong. Under Utah case law, evidence obtained from the Trooper's misconduct that
resulted in the intrusive search and seizure of the Appellants must be excluded. State v. Bello.
871 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 1994), State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990).
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14

Q.

And

15

it turned

said,

I unzipped

sack and I could
of

So I

that it was

the side of

the bag and when

to be a large quantity

Q.

bag and he

He indicated

around

sense

be put there.

look in the duffel

and I unzipped

appeared

11
12

could possibly

I had him step

8

in

there were other

items, drug

in the duffel bag, I b e l i e v e , is that

16

A.

That's

correct.

17

Q.

That's

the basis of these

18

A.

That

19

Q.

Is there

20

that wasn't

21

A.
didn't

23

the duffel

24

were

anything

in the duffel

charge

correct?

charges?

we've charged

them

with

bag?

W e l l , as far as that q u e s t i o n , n o .
them with anything

bag.

There were

s t a m p s , which

25 I the duffel

items,

is correct, y e s , sir.

Yes.

22

type

bag, but

turned

—

that wasn't

I'll

explain.

I

found
There

out to be LSD, that were

they were

in

in a pair of pants

in

that

1 I was separate
2 |

Q.

from

Okay.

the rest of the items

As far as the search

3 | g o e s , you were focused
4 |

A.

and seizure

issue

bag?

Y e s , sir.

MR. BUNDERSON:
this hearing

Your Honor, for the purpose

I think we've completed

7 | Just to follow
based

on the duffel

in the bag.

our

testimony.

through, of course, the charges

on what was found

in the duffel

of

baa after

are
it was

unz ipped.
10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

MR. BOUWHUIS:

Thank you.

12

to use the videotape

13

ques t i o n s .

14
15

Cross-examination.
At this time

I intend

of the stop to assist me in my

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. B O U W H U I S :
What I'm

16
17

screen

18

A

19

O

20

How is

Yes.

going

to do, can you see

this

Not wonderfully, but I can see it okay

How about

if I turn it a little bit

more?

that?

21

A.

That's bet ter.

22

O.

What we'll do is roll this tape and I'm

23

to pause

it at certain

24

questions.

25

I'll

sections

It's a short tape.

continue my

questioning.

and ask you
When

I'm

going

some

done with

it

1

MR. BUNDERSON:

It was a videotape made

2

scene.

3

videotape

4

when it begins and ends.

5

it to defense

We stipulate

that this is Officer

of some portions

MR. B O U W H U I S :

7

the content, the verbal

8

recorded

of the e v e n t .

by the court

THE COURT:

I'll

record your questions

11

not the contents

of

12

MR. BOUWHUIS:

13

MR. BUNDERSON:

sure

provided

not asking

that

content of the tape, be

reporter.
ask

the reporter

to

and the witness's

simply

a n s w e r s , but

the tape.
Thank

you.

Are you going

to mark

MR. B O U W H U I S :

When I'm

the

done we'll do

16

tape

that.

(Tape

17

Q.

(BY MR. BOUWHUIS)

18

discovered

19

was of legal age to possess

20

A.

or were

I discovered
check

22

good.

It takes me quite

23

is .

looked

the age.

We just heard

piayed.)

you

that Casey

Cutler

tobacco?

a driver's

really

Q.

At this point

able to ascertain

21

25

not

itself?

15

24

I'm

We made a copy and

By the way, I'm

10

14

Singleton's

counsel.

6

9

at the

l i c e n s e , but I didn't

My math skills

are not

that

a while to figure out what

a portion

t h e r e , after

at the l i c e n s e , or it appeared

l(r>

you were

19

you
looking

1
2

Q.
about

So you didn't have a conversation

A.

No.

4

Q.

Thank

Not that I can remember, n o .
you .

5

7

(Resume playing
Q.

(BY MR. BOUWHUIS)

speeding
A.

Y e s , sir.

9

Q.

And

10

smelled

11

the

them over

tobacco?

A.

A burnt

smell which

Q.

You asked

for

violation?

in the course of questioning

the burnt

tape.)

them

I assumed was

you

tobacco,

yes .

13
14

You pulled

and for a turn signal

8

12

ther

anything?

3

6

right

the

them

if there was any tobacco

car?

15

A.

Yes.

16

O.

And you asked

17

A.

Y e s , sir.

18

O

And

19

A.

That's

20

Q.

Okay.

found

no

to search

and did

correct.

(Resume playing
Q.

(BY MR. BOUWHUIS)

23

you recall

24

but he clearlv

25

DOD

the

him

trunk?

a search?

tobacco?

21
22

in

saying, and
hesitated

the

tape.)

Let's stop it there. Do
I couldn't hear it

clearly,

there when vou asked him

to

2 I

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And did he not say something

3 | checked

in Salt

4 I

A . I

5

Q.

6

A . I

7

Q.

8

heard

Lake?

honestly don't recall.

You don't recall him saying

that?

do n o t .

Let me rewind

it p r e v i o u s l y .

this real quick.
Maybe I'm

9
O.
said

(BY MR. BOUWHUIS)

I thought I

mistaken.

(Resume playing

10
11

about getting

the

tape.)

You don't recall what he

there?

12

I don * t recall

13

0.

You

14

A.

I might have heard, but I don't recall

Q.

But he clearly didn't say okay, I'll

15
16
17

it?

A.

that

pop

the

point?

No .

19

(Resume playing

20

0.

21

can d e s c r i b e

22

trunk?

(BY MR. BOUWHUIS)

23

A.

Yes .

24

0.

And

the

tape.)

Right t h e r e , just so we

for the record, Mr. Mondragon

you were standing at the

excuse m e , the right rear

25

it

now .

trunk, at

18

couldn't hear

corner?

I
P a n&

1Q

popped

left rear

--

the

it

A.

Yes.

O.

And

A.

Ye s , sir.

0.

And you popped

your heads

he was to your

into the

A.

Uh-huh.

O

And

looked

left?

the trunk

and you both poked

trunk?

at the right

taillight

box,

correc t ?
Tha t *s correct
10
11

0.

And at that point you could

difficult

to

see it would

access?

12

A.

Y e s , sir.

13

O.

That's why you said something

14

A.

That we'd have to tear the sucker

15

That's why

16

the s ame .

17
18

O.

I moved

Could

tear the sucker

you

tell if —

what?
apart.

apart.

you said we'll have to

Did he say

A.

N o , not that I remember.

20

O.

So you're

anything?

the only one who said

anything

there?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

There was no discussion

24

A.

No.

25

like

to the left side to see if it was

19

21

be

W e l l , yeah, he said

about

the

something

taillight?
about

not

beina able to aet into it and then that's when I made

Paae 20

1

the s t a t e m e n t , y e a h , you'll have to tear

2

apart.

3
4

Q.

Okay.

And

to Mr. M o n d r a g o n ' s
A.

Y e s , sir .

6

0.

And you

7

better

view

from

then you immediately
left, is that

5

the

looked
the

sucker

moved

around

correct?

into the trunk

and you had a

left?

8

A.

A better

9

Q.

Of

10

A.

A better view of the left side.

view?

the trunk

area.
As far as

11

the whole

trunk g o e s , see, right in the very center

12

the trunk

was a large

13

lot of

14

the center

speaker

area of the

Q.

Was that blocking

16

A.

No.

17

opened.

18

Q.

15

19

I could

You

Mondragon's

trunk.

your view of the

duffel

21

Q.

But you moved

22

A.

When

bag that

And

around

to his

it was originally

see the speaker
O.

see the duffel

bag when it was

right?

Yes.

25

consumed a

saw the duffel bag when you were on Mr.

A.

24

That

bag?

20

23

box.

of

left?

popped

open I could

box and I saw part of the duffel

at this point you asked him whose

was?

Page

21

bag.

duffel

1

A.

Y e s . sir.

2

Q.

Did you

3

duffel bag

4

A.

think

to repair

No.

there might be something

the

taillights?

I was thinking, you know, because

5

the strong

6

vehicle, you know, that there was a possibility

/

contraband

8
9
10

Q.

smell

rolled

and not even a cigarette butt

might be concealed

And you

you stopped

testified

the car and

down when you were
Ye s, sir.

12

Q.

You noticed

13

A.

It was a recently

14

Q.

You testified

15

A.

Yes.

stale.

17

and

• 18

I smoked

a fresh

in

the

that

they had
to

the

--

that

window

them?

smell?

burnt

earlier

smell.

that it was

than something

for a lot of y e a r s .

fresh?

that had

been

You get in a car
This

was

know.

19

Q.

20

smoking

21

A.

Y e s , sir.

22

Q.

Despite your search

23

that when

they have that stale old smoke odor.

fresh, you

we had

there.

earlier

talking

A.

Rather

back

I assume

11

16

in the

So you assumed
in the

at that point that they'd

been

vehicle?

c o m p a r t m e n t , you found no

of the

passenger

tobacco?

24

A.

That's

25

Q.

When you saw the duffel bag in the trunk,

correct.

Page

22

it

wa s c1osed ?
2

A.

Y e s , sir.

3

0.

Did

4

A.

Y e s , sir.

5

O.

Did it have any kind of logo on

6

A.

McGregor, I b e l i e v e , was

7

Q.

Let me back up.

it have a zipper on

driver, Mondragon, his driver's

9

registration,

it?

logo.

license

from

the

and

correct?

10

A.

Y e s , sir, that's

11

0.

Did those prove

12

A.

Ye s, sir.

13

O.

You had pulled

signal

the

You retrieved

8

14

it?

correct.
to be

valid?

him over

for speeding

and a

violation?

15

A.

That's

correct.

16

O.

At the point that you determined

17

license

18

issued

and registration
a citation

were valid,

at that

could you

A.

When I determined

20

Q.

Yes.

21

A.

Y e s , I could have

22

Q.

Okay.

that they were

issued

24

could you have concluded

25

citation

have

compartment

valid?

a citation.

At the point you concluded

of the passenger

driver'

point?

19

23

his

and found no

the

search

tobacco,

-- could you have issued a

for the speeding

and turn signal

<7^

violation?

A.

Y e s , sir, I could

have.

Q.

M r . Mondragon didn't

appear

to be impaired

in

a ny way?

5

A.

N o , sir,

O.

As far as you could

tell

from watching

6

v i d e o t a p e , at this point had you returned

7

squad

to your

car ?

8

A.

N o , sir, T hadn't yet.

9

O.

You

10

A.

N o , sir.

11

Q.

So you were still

12

back

the

of Mr.

hadn't?

holding

the

identification

Cutler?

13

A.

Y e s , sir.

14

O.

As well as Mr. Mondragon's

15

A.

And registration, y e s , sir.

16

Q.

And at the point that you are h e r e , this

17

point h e r e , where you have

18

asking

19

identification?

about

driver's

the trunk open and

A.

Y e s , sir.

21

O.

Clearly

22

A.

They wouldn't be free to leave, even

had

24

condition

25

their

you're

the duffel bag, you actually have

20

23

license?

they were not free to

items back, because of the

their

leave?
if

they

mechanical

of the vehicle.
(Resume playing

Pace

24

the

tape.)

go

true that -- I'll
You performed

a pat down on

A.

That's

0.

And

him to go

through Mr* Manzanares

first.

him?

correct.

it is true after

around

and stand

the pat down

you

ordered

in front of the car, is

that correc t ?
A,

That's

correct.

0.

Okay.

It's true that at that time he was not

free to

leave?

10

A.

At that time, no.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

him to stay

13

A.

14

ma ' am.

15

0.

16
17

there

is it also

true

in front of the

That's okay.

And

you

correct?

Y e s , ma'am, it is.

19

Yes,

20

And you asked him

21

Yes .

22

And there was ID in it?

23

That is correct.

25

that

a pat down of Mr. Cutler, is that

And on that you found

Q.

expected

I mean, yes,

it's also true

18

24

that you

car?

That is correct, y e s , sir.

performed
A.

And

a wallet?

ma'am.
to open it up?

And at that point you stated

possession

of his ID, is that

correct?

that you

took

1

your p o c k e t

2

A.

3

exactly

4

Q.

It was all

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q#

And

7

the car

also?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q#

And Mr. Cutler was not free

Am

Especially

10
11
12
13
14

along with Mr.

I placed

them

Mondragon's?

in my pocket.

I'm

not

—
in your

you ordered

possession?

Mr. Cutler

to go in front of

to go at that

time?
not when he told me he had a

warran t.
Q#

Okay.

if he had

Let's go back

to that.

You asked

him

a warrant?

15

A.

That * s correct.

16

Q^

And you asked him if he had warrants

17

you took possession

18

correct?

of his driver's

19

A.

While

20

Q.

You didn't return

21

A.

No,

22

Qm

And was he cooperative with

23 1

A.

Yes.

24 I

Q.

in fact, looking

25

sure

after

license, is that

I had possession, y e s .
the driver's

license?

ma'am, I did not.
you?

at the v i d e o , it seems

I all three defendants were quite

Page

cooperative?

30

like

l|

A.

2 | pointing

I didn't

find

any and I don't: recall

it out.

I remember

it being denied

him
that

there was any in the v e h i c l e .
4 I

Q.

Okay.

And you requested

Mr. Manzanares

5 I Mr. C u t l e r , as well as M r . Mondragon, to return
6 I vehicle

after you searched

7

A.

Yes .

8

0.

And your

9

contraband?
A.

There wasn't

11

0.

And

12

back

13

Cutler's

anything.

to the vehicle, you had possession
ID and Mr. Mondragon's

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Mr. Manzanares

16

request

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Why was

19

A.

So I could

20
21

in no type of

at that p o i n t , when you returned

that

didn't

that

check

if he had

22

had no articuable

23

Manzanares

25

and I wanted

ID?

have ID, but you did

for validity, see if he was
any w a r r a n t s .

suspicion

had done anything

A.

of Mr.

requested?

Is there any reason

24

them

information?

who he was and
Q.

to the

it?

search resulted

10

and

There was n o t h i n g .
to check out

—

isn't it true that

to believe

you

that Mr.

criminal?
He had no

identification

the individual

Pace

32

to see if he

was who he said he w a s .
Q.

2
3

Okay.

of criminal

But there was -- you had no

activity

on Mr.

suspicion

Manzanares?

4

A.

Not at the time, no.

5

Q.

And other

than the warrant

6

had stated, you had no suspicion

7

at that point concerning

that Mr.

Cutler

of criminal

activity

him?

8

A.

No .

9

Q.

At that point you could have went back

10

checked

the NCIC on Mr. Mondragon

11

written

a citation,

12

A.

13

have checked

14

Q.

15

Mr. Cutler's

16

A.

17

MS. BRIDGESS:

To state it c o r r e c t l y ,

the information

and written

the

citation.
return

correct?

correct.
I'm

sure Mr. Bouwhuis wants

18

but I would, Your Honor, like to also request

19

tape be admitted

20

Manzanares.

as evidence

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. B O U W H U I S :

23

I could

It's also true that you did not

ID at any time, is that

That's

and

correct?

I could have.

Okay.

come back

and

for Mr. Cutler

Do we have it marked
No.

I neglected

to,

that

and Mr.

yet?
to do that, Your

Honor.

24

MR. BUNDERSON:

25

THE COURT:

I'll

I have no objection.
ask

the clerk

the

to mark

it as

ADDENDUM B

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
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AMENDMENT XIII
Section
1 [Slavery prohibited ]
2 [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction
gee 2. [ P o w e r to e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection ]
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment ]
3. [Disqualification to hold office J
4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid ]
5. [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [ C i t i z e n s h i p — D u e p r o c e s s of l a w — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws

Amend. XVIII, § 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave,
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void
Sec. 5. [Power t o enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1 [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify ]
2 [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [Right of c i t i z e n s to vote — R a c e or color
not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the Umted States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration

'^
Sec, 2.

[ R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — P o w e r to r e d u c e appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
^whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
ktaxed But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
vof electors for President and Vice-President of the United
^States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judical Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
„being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
^ 1 1 be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
Sjgje citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
gfenty-one years of age in such State
c* 3. [Disqualification to h o l d office.]
\o person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
FV* Etedw of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
ffiSlpr military, under the United States, or under any State,
E ^ h a v i n g previously taken an oath, as a member of ConJfi§?» or1 as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
j ^ S i a t e legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
jffJSUtej to support the Constitution of the United States,
spJ^Kave engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
5§PJ*Tor given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But
^rfeess may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
^ability

f

[ P u b l i c d e b t n o t t o b e q u e s t i o n e d — D e b t s of
t h e C o n f e d e r a c y a n d c l a i m s n o t t o b e paid.]
^validity of the public debt of the United States, authoPy law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions

AMENDMENT XVII
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years, and each Senator shall have one vote The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
m the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution
AMENDMENT XVIII
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933 SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION 1 ]
Section
1 [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors ]
2 [Concurrent power to enforce amendment ]
3 [Time limit for adoption ]
S e c t i o n 1. [National p r o h i b i t i o n — I n t o x i c a t i n g liquors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
withm, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Art. I, § 9
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law
1988 (2nd s s )

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor
1896
S e c . 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer t h a n eight persons In other cases the Legislature
shall establish the number ofjurors by statute, but m no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous In civil cases three
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded
1996

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him m his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without demal or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
n a t u r e and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself, a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy fbr the same offense
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule
1994

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature
1947

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden
ance of warrant.]
£<|
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hou
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sen
shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but ujj
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particula
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing |
be seized
*
Sec. 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e press — LibeL
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedoino
speech or of the press In all criminal prosecutions for libel t
t r u t h may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it s h _
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true!
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable end
the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the i
to determine the law and the fact
Sec. 16.

[No i m p r i s o n m e n t for debt — Exception.]

J

There shall be no imprisonment for debt except m cases of
absconding debtors
\#f
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]

*j

All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or mihtar^
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the^
right of suffrage Soldiers in time of war, may vote at their*
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law
1896
Sec. 18.

[Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing

contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed
1896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act
1896^

Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be m strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war
except in a m a n n e r to be prescribed by law
1896

Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State
1896

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without j u s t compensation
1896

Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity
1896

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation
1896

Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
l99
or deny others retained by the people
*

Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory a n "
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise
1896
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section (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a
third degree felony a n d is also subject to a civil penalty
not to exceed $5,000.
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall
be deposited in the General Fund.
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit
information to the database as required under this section
after the division h a s submitted a specific written request
for the information or when the division determines the
individual has a demonstrable p a t t e r n of failing to submit
the information as required is grounds for the division to
take the following actions in accordance with Section
58-1-401:
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew t h e individual's license;
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the
individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted,
lb) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection la)Vvi)
shall be deposited in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 53-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(13) An individual who h a s submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by
appropriations from the General Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any resources within the Commerce Service
Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drug outlet.
1096
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d t h a t is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a p a r t of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions t h a t are u n d e r t a k e n in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the

person occupies a position of organizer, supers
sor^ or any other position of management. &&
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (jftv
with respect to:
><jt
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II fa
controlled substance analog is guilty of a secoitf
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent co&.
viction is guilty of a first degree felony;
*': *
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV/o*
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upbo
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
J
degree felony; or
5i
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guiltyof
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony^
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
JJ-r
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
-^
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally t£
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it vraT
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized'ny
this subsection;
*
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to'
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-|
stances in any of those locations;
.J
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marij u a n a , if the amount is more t h a n 16 ounces, but less
t h a n 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, w
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the ft)*"111
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, ana
the amount is more t h a n one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsectio Q
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Secti o n
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of poss^ s "
sion of any controlled substance by a person, t h a t p e r s o n
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) wtfk
respect to all other controlled substances not included &
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less t h a n o fle
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanorUpon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent convicti^ n
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsecti0 n
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
meanor;
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
(viii); or
misdemeanor; and
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of
third degree felony.
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
not less than five years if the penalty that would other(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intenwise have been established but for this subsection would
tionally:
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
distribution of a controlled substance a license numeligible for probation.
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
established would have been less than a first degree
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or reprefelony but for this subsection, a person convicted under
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoththis subsection is guilty of one degree more than the
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other aumaximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
thorized person;
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the indiattempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any peroffense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
son known to be attemptmg to acquire or obtain
that
the actor mistakenly believed that the location where
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a)
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ- specified is a class B misdemeanor.
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
false name or address;
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter that offense.
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
m addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law.
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
under federal law or the law of another state for the same
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evicounterfeit controlled substance,
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con} is guilty of a third degree felony.
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a of the substance or substances.
person not authorized under this chapter who commits
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is com- and supervision.
mitted:
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary this section on:
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
those schools or institutions;
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
legitimate scope of his employment.
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of
by or through a school or institution under Subsecany provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid,
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
58-37-8.5. Applicability of Title 76 prosecutions under
recreation center;
this chapter.
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this
or structure adjacent thereto;
chapter.
1997
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;

Supreme v/uu* t.
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;jg^# Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
h) T^e Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all exLrdinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
k| (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and deI'crees; or
V- (b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includL jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
§£, (a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
'the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed'ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commisfsion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
IfTrust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direcJt tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
f&Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
||r,x subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
$(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
,(e)_appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
scept those involving a conviction of a first degree or
.capital felony;
JjQwappeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
rits ^sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
^ X other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
©3§_or capital felony;
^g^appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi^y^^yrits challenging the decisions of the Board of
§£dtas and Parole except in cases involving a first
^ee^or, capital felony;
a\n)? appeals from district court involving domestic relav ^ ^ s e s , including, but not limited to, divorce, annul%
^& property division, child custody, support, visitation,
S ^ ^ a n d paternity;
IgPpeals from the Utah Military Court; and
il§J^§?s transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
IBgDie Court.
SpjCourt of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
._§pginal appellate review and determination any
S¥f^hich the Court of Appeals has original appellate
..^ourt of Appeals shall comply with the requireffitle 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
KXk w of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1996
J&kview of actions by Supreme C o u r t
jaj* e Judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
V*J^^ e by petition for writ of certiorari to the
V*rt>
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ADDENDUM C

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
1
j

Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs
CASE NOS.
CASEY J. CUTLER
ELMER R. MONDRAGON, JR.
RONNIE J. MANZANARES

j
|

Defendants

!

951000128
961000027
951000129

i

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Motions to Suppress filed by all
three (3) defendants. The Court held oral arguments and received testimony and has
reviewed memoranda submitted by counsel. The facts may be briefly summarized as
follows:
On September 22, 1995, at approximately 1:30 p.m. Officer Scott Singleton was
southbound on 1-15 north of the Perry Port of Entry. He observed a vehicle traveling at an
above average speed and paced the vehicle in his patrol car at a speed of 72 MPH in a 65
MPH zone. The vehicle made a sudden lane change from the left lane to the right lane
without signaling. Trooper Singleton then pulled the vehicle over. During the discussion
which followed, it was detennined Elmer Mondragon was the owner/driver of the vehicle
and that he had a valid driver's license. Additionally, it was determined that Casey J. Cutler
was one of the passengers and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The officer
had the defendants assist him in testing the turn signals and brake lights and detennined that
neither the turn signals nor the brake lights were working on the rear of the vehicle, although
apparently the turn signals did work on the fkmt of the vehicle. Because the front lights
worked, the officer theorized that a fuse was not out but that perhaps there was a problem
2
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a

with wiring or a light bulb. The defendant opened the trunk of the vehicle and it was
determined that the tail lights were enclosed in such a way that tools would be required in
order to gain access to the bulbs. At that time, a single duffle bag was observed in the trunk
of the car and the officer asked Mondragon if he could look in the duffle bag. Mondragon
said he could. The officer found a substantial quantity of marijuana in the bag.
There was clearly probable cause for the initial stop. Additionally, the officer
appears justified in his conclusion that the vehicle should not proceed down the highway
without turn signals or brake lights.
There are several aspects of this scenario which are troubling. The officer indicated
that he smelled what he interpreted to be tobacco smoke in the car and that he thought that
the occupants were under age. The driver's license of Casey Joe Cutler plainly showed him
to be several years older than necessary to possess and smoke tobacco. Additionally, no
tobacco was located in the vehicle until much later during an inventory search. There
seemed to be some question whether the officer asked defendant Mondragon to open the
trunk or whether he directed him to open the trunk.1 In any event, Mondragon opened the
trunk. Prior to opening the duffle bag, the officer did not have any articulable evidence that
the bag was involved in any type of criminal activity.
After carefully considering the authorities cited by counsel and reviewing notes of the
hearing, the Coun is of the opinion that defendant Mondragon lawfully consented to a search
of the duffle bag. It is true that the defendant was not free to leave at the time the officer
requested permission to search the bag. However, the cases indicate there is no bright line
nor is there any single factor which is dispositive in determining whether a consent is
voluntary. In this case, the Court finds that the driver gave permission to look in the bag the
first time such permission was requested. The request came after a reasonably brief

Defense counsel argue that the officer's entry into the trunk constituted nothing more than a fishing
expedition. However, the officer testified that on numerous occasions he has assisted motorists with minor
repairs, including changing fan belts. Because the front blinkers were functioning, the officer reasonably
concluded that he may be able to resolve the mechanical problem for the defendant. Had the occupants of this
vehicle been an elderly couple or a mother with young children, the officer would have been expected to
provide the courtesy of attempting to repair a minor wiring or bulb problem. The fact that he attempted to
assist these defendants is not viewed as a sinister act.
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CASEY J. CUTLER
ELMER R. MONDRAGON
RONNIE J. MANZANARES
Case Nos. 951000128
951000127
951000128

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision and
Order dated August j_(£, 1996, to Attorney Candace Bridgess, 2568 Washington #102, Ogden UT
84401; Attorney Michael Bouwhuis, 2568 Washington #102, Ogden UT 84401; and Attorney
Jon Bunderson, 45 N 100 E, Brigham City UT 84302.
Dated August [{£, 1996.

Deputy Clerk

detention. There is likewise an absence of any threats or promises concerning the bag.
There is no evidence the officer engaged in any trickery nor is there any evidence that the
defendant's mental state was impaired. The defendant's voluntary consent to search the bag
was consistent with the defendant's prior behavior; i.e. he had been cooperative with the
officer. For the foregoing reasons, the consent is adjudged voluntary and the Motions to
Suppress are denied.
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